Abstract. The noncooperative multi-leader-follower game can be formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where each player solves a nonconvex mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. Two major deficiencies exist with such a formulation: One is that the resulting Nash equilibrium may not exist, due to the nonconvexity in each player's problem; the other is that such a nonconvex Nash game is computationally intractable. In order to obtain a viable formulation that is amenable to practical solution, we introduce a class of remedial models for the multi-leader-follower game that can be formulated as generalized Nash games with convexified strategy sets. In turn, a game of the latter kind can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality for whose solution we develop an iterative penalty method. We establish the convergence of the method, which involves solving a sequence of penalized variational inequalities, under a set of modest assumptions. We also discuss some oligopolistic competition models in electric power markets that lead to multi-leader-follower games.
Introduction
It is by now a well-known fact that the Nash equilibrium problem where each player solves a convex program can be formulated and solved as a finite-dimensional variational inequality [11, 17] . The generalized Nash game is a Nash game in which each player's strategy set depends on the other players' strategies. The connection between the generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) was recognized by Bensoussan [4] as early as 1974 who studied these problems with quadratic functionals in Hilbert space. Harker [16] revisited these problems in Euclidean spaces. Robinson [35, 36] discussed an application of a generalized Nash problem in a two-sided game model of combat. Kocvara and Outrata [26] discussed a class of QVIs with applications to engineering. Wei and Smeers [42] introduced a QVI formulation of a spatial oligopolisitic electricity model with Cournot generators and regulated transmission prices. Pang [31] recently analyzes the computational resolution of the generalized Nash game by the Josephy-Newton method [23, 11] .
Unlike the VI, which has a long history and an extensive literature (see the monograph [11] , which presents a state-of-the-art study of finite-dimensional variational inequalities and complementarity problems), the study of the QVI to date is in its infancy at best. In particular, there is only a handful of papers that address the QVI in finite dimensions in terms of existence of solutions [8, 34, 43] (see also [11, Section 2.8] ) and in solution methods [26, 31] . As such, it is of independent interest to develop efficient computational methods for solving QVIs. This is one motivation for the present research.
More importantly, another motivation of the present paper stems from some recent oligopolistic competition models in the electricity power markets, which can be formulated as a unified Nash equilibrium problem, where each player solves a nonconvex optimization problem, called a "subgame equilibrium". One such model [7, 20] describes the bidding strategy of a dominant firm (the leader) in a competitive electricity market, whose goal is to maximize its profit subject to a set of price equilibrium constraints. The mathematical formulation for this model with a single dominant firm is thus a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints, or simply, an MPEC. Due to the disjunctive complementarity conditions in its constraints, an MPEC is a difficult, nonconvex optimization problem [27, 30] ; efficient methods for computing globally optimal solutions are to date not available. In practice, the multi-dominant firm problem is of greater importance; and yet, as a Nash game, the latter problem can have no equilibrium solution in the standard sense. An example due to Hobbs [19] which we reproduce later illustrates this non-existence of solution. In game-theoretic language, while the problem of a single dominant firm can be identified with a Stackelberg leader-follower game, whose relation with the MPEC is known [27] , that of multidominant firms corresponds to a noncooperative game with multiple leaders and several followers, which as a Nash problem is defined by players solving nonconvex subgame equilibrium problems. A major objective of the present paper is to propose QVI relaxations for a "nonconvex Nash problem" of the latter kind.
A related Nash problem with nonconvex subgame equilibria arises from an alternative competitive electricity model. Originated from Hobbs [18] and further developed in several subsequent papers [28, 33, 21] , the model aims at understanding the strategic behavior of several firms in dealing with the presence of an arbitrager in the market. There are two behavioral approaches considered; exogenous versus endogenous arbitrage. In the exogenous-arbitrage approach, the arbitrager is considered a Nash player who maximizes its profit and occupies a role in the game just like all other players, including the firms. This approach leads to a standard Nash equilibrium problem that can be formulated as a linear or nonlinear complementarity problem, depending on other model characteristics. In the endogenous-arbitrage approach, the firms anticipate the behavior of the arbitrager and therefore include the optimality conditions and the associated variables of the arbitrager's profit maximization problem in their own optimization problems. In the cited references, the arbitrager's problem is a simple equality-constrained linear program whose optimality conditions is a system of linear equations. Therefore, there is no great technical difficulty including the latter equations in the constraints of the firms' problems. Nevertheless, a tremendous challenge arises with the endogenous-arbitrage approach when there are inequality constraints present in the arbitrager's problem. The optimality conditions of the latter problem involve complementarity conditions, which when put into the constraints of the firms' optimization problems turn the latter into MPECs. Once again, a Nash problem with nonconvex subgame equilibria is obtained.
The Generalized Nash Game as a QVI
The generalized Nash game with N players may be defined in the following abstract way. For ν = 1, . . . , N , let K ν : ℜ n −ν → ℜ nν be a given set-valued map, where each n ν is a positive integer, n ≡ N ν=1 n ν and n −ν ≡ n − n ν ; thus for each x −ν ∈ ℜ n −ν , K ν (x −ν ) is a subset of ℜ nν , which is the strategy set of player ν. We write a vector x ∈ ℜ n in the partitioned form:
with each x ν ∈ ℜ nν .
For the most part in the paper, we assume that K ν (x −ν ) is finitely representable by convex inequalities. To describe such a representation and each player's optimization problem, let g ν : ℜ n → ℜ mν , h ν : ℜ nν → ℜ ℓν , and θ ν : ℜ n → ℜ be given functions, where m ν and ℓ ν are positive integers. We make the following blanket convexity assumption for each ν = 1, . . . , N .
Convexity assumption. Each function h ν j is continuously differentiable and convex on ℜ nν for all j = 1, . . . , ℓ ν ; moreover, for each x −ν ∈ ℜ n −ν , the functions θ ν (x −ν , ·) and g ν i (x −ν , ·) are continuously differentiable and convex in the argument x ν for each i = 1, . . . , m ν .
The functions g ν and h ν are distinguished by their arguments; the former is a function of the entire vector x ∈ ℜ n whereas the latter is a function of only the subvector x ν . This distinction is motivated by the application in the generalized Nash game where x ν is the strategy vector of player ν and x is the strategy vector of all the N players in the game. We then define
thus K ν (x −ν ) is a closed convex subset of ℜ nν . Here we see that player ν's strategies are constrained in two ways: those that are dependent on other players' strategies g ν (x) ≤ 0 and those that are dependent solely on player ν's strategies h ν (x ν ) ≤ 0. This distinction is useful for both the treatment of the existence of solution and the penalty method described subsequently.
The generalized Nash game is to find a tuple x * ≡ (x * ,ν ) ∈ ℜ n , called a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE), such that for each ν = 1, . . . , N , x * ,ν is an optimal solution of the convex optimization problem in the variable x ν with x −ν fixed at x * ,−ν :
Defining
and
we see that x * is a GNE if and only if x * ∈ K(x * ) and
The latter problem is an instance of the QVI, which is formally defined in the next subsection. For each tuple x −ν ∈ ℜ n −ν , let S ν (x −ν ) ⊂ ℜ nν denote the optimal solution set of player ν's optimization problem (2) parameterized by its rivals' strategy vector x −ν . A GNE is thus a tuple x * such that x * ,ν ∈ S ν (x * ,−ν ) for all ν.
Existence of a solution to a QVI
Formally, given a point-to-point map F from ℜ n into itself and a point-to-set map K from ℜ n into subsets of ℜ n , the QVI (K, F ) is to find a vector x * ∈ K(x * ) such that
When K(x) is independent for every x ∈ ℜ n , say, K(x) = K for all x, the QVI becomes the VI of finding
We recall that a set-valued map Φ : ℜ n → ℜ m is continuous at a vector x if Φ is both upper and lower semicontinuous at x. Upper semicontinuity at x means that for every ε > 0 there exists an open neighborhood N of x such that
where IB(0, r) denotes the open Euclidean ball centered at the origin and with radius r > 0; lower semicontinuity at x means that for every open set U such that Φ(x) ∩ U = ∅, there exists an open neighborhood N of x such that for each y ∈ N , Φ(y) ∩ U = ∅. We say that Φ is continuous in a domain if it is continuous at every point in the domain. For excellent references on set-valued maps, see [1, 37] .
In the existence result below, we postulate that the set-valued map K is compact-valued and continuous. We do not impose any special structure on the sets K(x). This general framework is presented herein for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 1 Let F be a continuous point-to-point map from ℜ n into itself and let K be a pointto-set map from ℜ n into subsets of ℜ n . Assume that there exists a compact convex set T ⊂ ℜ n such that (a) for every x ∈ T , K(x) is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of T ; (b) K is continuous at every point in T .
Then the QVI (K, F ) has a solution.
Proof. It is clear that
Thus the theorem follows from Corollary 3.1 in [8] .
It is possible to refine the above theorem by relaxing the boundedness of the sets K(x) and replacing it by strengthened assumptions of F (such as some form of coercivity), for our purpose in this paper, Theorem 1 is sufficient.
Existence of a GNE
Theorem 1 can certainly be applied to the generalized Nash problem, provided that the strategy map K given by (3) is continuous. While such a continuity condition (or its refinement) is appropriate in the general framework where no special structure is assumed on each set K ν (x), when the latter is finitely representable by convex inequalities, as in (1), it is possible to give a more direct treatment of the existence of a GNE that takes advantage of the explicit representation of the set K ν (x). The treatment still employs Kakutani's fixed-point theorem.
Before proceeding further, we contrast our treatment of this problem with a similar treatment employed by Robinson [36] . While both use Kakutani's fixed-point theorem, the main difference between our approach and Robinson's lies in how the "rival-dependent constraints" are being handled. Whereas Robinson's approach is based on convex analysis and the theory of functional epiconvergence (see also [24] ), which is fairly general and requires no particular representation of the strategy sets K ν (x −ν ) nor the differentiability of the players' objective functions, our approach below is based on constraint qualifications on the latter sets and on the KKT systems of the players' optimization problems. The approach is therefore more "computation-friendly" and the required assumptions are generally easier to verify than those in the epiconvergence approach.
To begin, let us write down the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) system of player ν's optimization problem (2) :
where λ ν ∈ ℜ mν and µ ν ∈ ℜ ℓν are the KKT multipliers of the constraints g ν (x) ≤ 0 and h ν (x ν ) ≤ 0, respectively, in the set K ν (x −ν ), and a ⊥ b means two vectors a and b satisfy a T b = 0. We postulate the following Sequentially Bounded Constraint Qualification for every player ν = 1, . . . , N .
(SBCQ) For every bounded sequence {x k } ⊂ ℜ n such that x k,ν ∈ S ν (x k,−ν ) for every k, there exists a bounded sequence {(λ k,ν , µ k,ν )} such that the pair (λ k,ν , µ k,ν ) satisfies the KKT system (5) corresponding to x k for every k.
The SBCQ was introduced in [27] for the study of the MPEC; it is a unification of various well-known CQs such as the Mangasarian-Fromovitz CQ and the constant-rank CQ of Janin. In particular, the SBCQ plays an important role in the existence of an optimal solution to an MPEC; such a role persists in the present context of a GNE. Rather than repeating all the special cases of the SBCQ (for which the details can be found in the cited reference), we consider the important case where both g ν and h ν are affine functions and present the proof to show that such linear constraints satify the SBCQ easily. Letting
Since the gradients ∇ x ν g ν i (x) and ∇h ν (x ν ) are constant vectors, it follows that if x ν belongs to S ν (x −ν ), then by polyhedral theory, there exist nonnegative λ ν and µ ν that satisfy the above three sets of equations. Moreover, (λ ν , µ ν ) is represented as
where A ν (x) is a linear operator depending only on α ν (x) and γ ν (x), rather than on x. Since there are only finitely many index sets α ν (x) and γ ν (x ν ) (even though there is a continuum of values for x), (6) shows that (λ ν , µ ν ) is bounded as long as x belongs to a bounded set. This indicates that the SBCQ holds for the linearly constrained generalized Nash problem.
We need a compactness assumption and a feasibility assumption for each ν = 1, . . . , N . Let
Compactness assumption. The set X ν is nonempty and bounded.
Feasibility assumption. For each x −ν ∈ X −ν , the set K ν (x −ν ) is nonempty.
The compactness and feasibility assumptions together imply that S ν (x −ν ) is nonempty for all
Theorem 2 Under the convexity, compactness, and feasibility assumptions and the SBCQ, there exists a GNE.
which, by assumption, is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of ℜ n . Define the set-valued mapping Φ : X → X, where for each
For each x ∈ X, Φ(x) is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of X. It suffices to show that Φ is a closed point-to-set map. In turn, we need to show that if
are sequences in ℜ n such that
and lim
for all ν = 1, . . . , N and that y k,ν ∈ S ν (x k,−ν ) for all k and all ν, it then follows that y ∞,ν ∈ S ν (x ∞,−ν ) for all ν. Fix an arbitrary ν and define for each k, z
The sequence {z k } converges to the limit z
, where
For each k, there exist λ k,ν and µ k,ν satisfying the KKT system:
moreover, by the SBCQ, we may assume, without loss of generality, that the sequence {(λ k,ν , µ k,ν )} converges to a pair (λ ∞,ν , µ ∞,ν ). Passing to the limit k → ∞, we conclude readily that y ∞,ν ∈ S ν (x ∞,−ν ) as desired, by the convexity assumption.
A Sequential Penalty VI Approach to QVIs
To take advantage of the computational advances for solving VIs [11] , we propose a penalty approach for solving a QVI of the following kind: For given continuous mappings F :
where
We denote this problem by QVI (F, G, H). In the application to the GNE, the mapping F is given by (4), the mapping G is given by
. . .
for x ≡ (x ν ) n ν=1 and y ≡ (y ν ) n ν=1 both in ℜ n ; and the mapping H is given by
Consistent with the compactness assumption, we assume that the set
is nonempty and bounded. Moreover, we assume that each component function H j is convex; thus X is a nonempty, compact, convex set. Note that, by (8) , the set X can be written as the Cartesian product of the sets
that is
Although many iterative algorithms for solving mixed complementarity problems can in principle be applied to the equivalent KKT system of the above QVI (F, G, H), the regularity conditions that are needed for the convergence of these algorithms (see [11, Chapter 10] ) are in jeopardy, due to the dependence of the function G on two arguments x and y. Instead of deriving restrictive conditions on the triple (F, G, H) to satisfy these conditions, we adopt a different approach for solving the QVI (F, G, H), which is inspired by the augmented Lagrangian approach for nonlinear programming [5, 6] . The key idea is to penalize the nonstandard constraint G(x, y) ≤ 0 via a penalty term and to solve a sequence of penalized VIs on the set X. Details of the resulting algorithm are described below.
A penalty method. Let {ρ k } be a sequence of positive scalars satisfying ρ k < ρ k+1 and tending to ∞. Let {u k } be a given sequence of vectors. Generate a sequence of iterates {x k } as follows: For each k, x k is a solution of the VI k , which is to find x ∈ X such that for all x ′ ∈ X,
Since X is a compact convex set, each iterate x k exists and stays in X. Hence the sequence {x k } is bounded. By imposing an appropriate condition on a limit point x ∞ of such a sequence, we show that x ∞ is a solution of the QVI (F, G, H).
Theorem 3 Let F : ℜ n → ℜ n be continuous. Let each H j : ℜ n → ℜ be a continuously differentiable, convex function. Suppose that the set X is nonempty and compact. Assume that G : ℜ 2n → ℜ m is continuous and that for each x ∈ X, the function G i (x, ·) is continuously differentiable and convex. Let {ρ k } be a sequence of positive scalars satisfying ρ k < ρ k+1 and tending to ∞. Let {u k } be a bounded sequence of vectors. Let x ∞ be the limit of a convergent subsequence {x k : k ∈ κ}. If the following implication holds:
Proof. We claim that, for all k ∈ κ sufficiently large, a multiplier µ k exists such that
In turn, this holds under the condition that for all k ∈ κ sufficiently large,
the latter condition being equivalent to the Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification for the VI k at the solution x k . Note that γ k ⊆ γ for all k sufficiently large. Assume that the displayed implication fails to hold for infinitely many k's in κ. It then follows that a nonempty index set γ ∞ ⊆ γ exists such that for every k in an infinite index subset κ ′ of κ, the following system of linear inequalities has a solution in µ k j :
We may assume without loss of generality that for each j ∈ γ ∞ , the sequence {µ k j : k ∈ κ ′ } converges to a limit µ ∞ j , which must satisfy
In view of the fact that γ ∞ ⊆ γ, the above expression contradicts the assumed implication (11) . Consequently, the claim at the opening of the proof holds. For all k ∈ κ sufficiently large, we can rewrite the first displayed equation as
The sequences
} and { µ k j } must be bounded for every i ∈ α and j ∈ γ; otherwise, we would easily get a contradiction to (11) . This implies that G(x ∞ , x ∞ ) ≤ 0 and that there exist nonnegative λ * i and µ * j satisfying
This shows that the triple (x ∞ , λ * , µ * ), where λ * i = µ * j = 0 for all i ∈ α and j ∈ γ, satisfies the KKT system of the QVI (F, G, H). Equivalently, x * is a solution of the QVI.
In Theorem 3, the sequence {u k } is somewhat arbitrary and only assumed to be bounded. By analogy with the augmented Lagrangian method, we may update u k successively by the formula
The proof of the theorem shows that the sequence {u k } defined in this way is indeed bounded, provided that (11) holds at every accumulation point of the sequence {x k }.
Specialization to a generalized Nash game
When specialized to a generalized Nash game, the above penalty method has the following gametheoretic interpretation. First let u k ≡ (u k,ν ) N ν=1 ∈ ℜ m with u k,ν ∈ ℜ mν for each ν = 1, . . . , N . Then, from (4), (7) and (10), the VI k solved at each iteration of the penalty method can be restated as follows: For each ν = 1, . . . , N , find a vector x ν ∈ X ν such that for all
This together with (9) implies that, at the k-th iteration, each player ν = 1, . . . , N , taking the other players' strategies x −ν as exogenous variables, solves the optimization problem over its variable x ν :
The overall iterate
is thus a standard Nash equilibrium where each player has a modified objective function given by
which remains convex, and a convex strategy set
that is independent of its rivals' strategies. The convergence of this sequential Nash equilibrium approach to a generalized Nash equilibrium is ensured under the assumptions in Theorem 3.
In principle, the above algorithmic approach does not require the differentiability of the functions involved. Nevertheless, in the absence of any function differentiability, the practical implementation of the approach by VI methods is in serious jeopardy. In fact, even in the case of twice continuously differentiable data functions, the objective function in (12), due to the second summand, is only SC 1 , meaning that it is once continuously differentiable with a "semismooth" gradient. As such, in applying the VI methods that require derivatives [11] for solving the Nash equilibrium subproblems, one has to take note of such weak smoothness in the resulting functions that define the equivalent VIs.
As an alternative to the quadratic max-penalty in the objective function of (12), we could employ an exponential penalty [5, 41] , which has a more favorable property with respect to differentiability. Specifically, the optimization problem (12) for each player ν may be replaced by
which, in the setting of the original QVI (F, G, H), amounts to solving the following VI: Find a vector x ∈ X such that for all x ′ ∈ X,
Problem (13) is twice continuously differentiable whenever so are the data functions. Morever it is not difficult to see that the convergence result stated in Theorem 3 remains valid for the exponential penalty method. Other exampls of smooth penalty functions may be found, for example, in [2, 3, 5] .
Multi-Leader-Follower Games
The generalized Nash problem provides a mathematical model for a noncooperative game in which each player takes no leadership position over its rivals. In the case where one or more players assume the role of leader(s) in the game, then a multi-leader-follower game arises, the simplest of which is the Stackelberg game in which there is one leader and multiple followers who react to the leader's strategies. A mathematical model for the Stackelberg game is the MPEC, for which there already exists an extra layer of complexity over the generalized Nash problem presented above.
For simplicity, we consider a game with two leaders, labelled I and II, and N followers, labelled ν = 1, . . . , N ; we further assume a leader's strategy set is independent of its rival's strategies. Let X I ⊆ ℜ n I and X II ⊆ ℜ n II denote the strategy sets of leaders I and II, respectively. The leaders' objective functions are denoted by ϕ I (x I , x II , y) and ϕ II (x I , x II , y), respectively. The notation suggests that each leader's objective is a function of its own and the rival leader's strategies and also of the followers' strategies that are collectively denoted by the vector y. The followers respond to the leaders' strategies in the following way. For each ν = 1, . . . , N , let θ ν (x I , x II , y) and K ν (x I , x II , y −ν ) denote, respectively, follower ν's objective function and strategy set that depends on the pair of strategies (x I , x II ) ∈ X I × X II . For each such pair (x I , x II ), the followers' problem is modeled by a generalized Nash game parameterized by the leaders' strategies; let Y (x I , x II ) denote the set of such GNEs, which we do not assume to be a singleton. Specifically, each elementỹ ∈ Y (x I , x II ) ⊆ ℜ n is a tuple (ỹ ν ) N ν=1 , where
such that eachỹ ν is an optimal solution of follower ν's optimization problem:
in which the tuple (x I , x II ,ỹ −ν ) is exogenous to the minimization and y ν is the primary variable to be computed.
We can now define a concept of Nash equilibrium for the above 2-leader-multi-follower game. Specifically, a pair (x * ,I , x * ,II ) ∈ X I × X II is said to be a L/F Nash equilibrium, where L/F means leader-follower, if there exists (y * ,I , y * ,II ) such that (x * ,I , y * ,I ) is an optimal solution of leader I's problem, which is to seek (x I , y I ) to minimize ϕ I (x I , x * ,II , y I ) subject to x I ∈ X I and y I ∈ Y (x I , x * ,II ) (15) and (x * ,II , y * ,II ) is an optimal solution of leader II's problem, which is to seek (x II , y II ) to minimize ϕ II (x * ,I , x II , y II ) subject to x II ∈ X II and y II ∈ Y (x * ,I , x II ).
Notice that in the above definition, the followers' equilibrium strategies, y * ,I and y * ,II , while both being elements of the equilibrium response set Y (x * ,I , x * ,II ), are not required to be equal. The reason for this flexibility is that since y * ,I and y * ,II are leader I's and II's anticipation of the followers' collective response to the pair (x * ,I , x * ,II ), and since such anticipation may be different among the leaders (due to the non-uniqueness of the followers' equilibrium responses), it seems reasonable not to require the equality between y * ,I and y * ,II . Of course, this issue disappears when Y (x * ,I , x * ,II ) is a singleton. One could also define a variation of the above problem by stipulating a market clearing mechanism that enforces y * ,I = y * ,II . As we see from the example below, a L/F Nash equilibrium may not exist even when Y (x I , x II ) is a singleton for all (x I , x II ).
Individually, problems (15) and (16) are constrained optimization problems with equilibrium constraints; i.e., MPECs. A major difficulty associated with such an MPEC is the nonconvexity of its feasible region, which in turn is due to the disjunction that is the result of the complementary slackness condition in the KKT system describing the response set Y (x I , x II ). Although there is much progress in research on the MPEC [10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 29, 32, 39, 38, 40] , the computation of global solutions to MPECs remains elusive, if not impossible. Consequently, each leader's problem is by itself already not easy to deal with.
Notwithstanding the technical difficulty in the leaders' individual optimization problems, the above leader-follower problem is a genuine noncooperative game with the leaders being the dominant players and with a well-defined equilibrium concept. Nevertheless, due to the nonconvexity of the response set Y (x I , x II ) in general, the existence of a L/F Nash equilibrium is in jeopardy; see the examples to follow. Even in the favorable case where such an equilibrium exists, its complete characterization remains a daunting, if not impossible, task. (This is unlike the standard Nash problem that has an equivalent VI formulation.) Finally, any rigorous attempt to compute a L/F Nash equilibrium (if it exists) is presently out of the reach of existing methods.
In summary, although the multi-leader-follower problem is a sensible mathematical model with a well-defined solution concept, its high level of complexity and technical hardship make it a computationally intractable problem. Subsequently, we present a proposal for the remedial resolution of this game problem. Before doing so, we describe a numerical example of a nonconvex Nash problem that has no equilibrium. (A word about notation; we use subscripts to denote scalar quantities.) It is easy to see that the optimal solution set to this problem is a singleton, which write as
Unlike leader I's problem, which is convex, leader II's optimization problem is written as the following nonconvex problem: For fixed but arbitrary
It is easy to see that the optimal solution set to leader II's problem is given by
. The graphs of the two optimal sets are
it is easy to see that these two graphs do not intersect. Hence there exists no L/F Nash equilibrium to this game. Note that gph E II is nonconvex.
Part of the culprit for the non-existence of a L/F Nash equilibrium in the above example is the non-convexity of the optimal solution set E II (1/2), which in turn is due to the non-convexity of leader II's optimization problem. This situation is typical of a multi-leader-follower game and is reminiscent of the well-known fact that a two-person, zero-sum matrix game need not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. In this elementary case, randomization of the pure strategies, which leads to the notion of mixed strategies, provides a remedy to the original difficulty.
Remedial models
The graph of the response multifunction Y is usually nonconvex. In a nutshell, our proposal to remedy the non-existence of a L/F Nash equilibrium is to convexify this graph. The overall idea can be compared to the convexification of the pure strategies by mixed strategies in a matrix game. Nevertheless, unlike the simple case where the pure strategies are finite and known explicitly, a straightforward convexification of the graph of Y may not lead to a computationally feasible resolution because this graph is in general a continuum and can be quite complex.
To describe our proposal, we assume that for each (x I , x II ) in X I × X II and each ν = 1, . . . , N ,
where g ν : ℜ n I +n II +n → ℜ mν and h ν : ℜ n I +n II +nν → ℜ ℓν are continuously differentiable. Expressed in terms of the KKT conditions of the followers' optimization problems (14), leader I's optimization problem is written as follows: With x II as an exogenous variable, find (x I , y I , λ I,ν , µ I,ν ) ∈ ℜ n I +n+mν +ℓν to
In general, the constraints of the above problem are highly nonlinear and nonconvex in its variables.
In what follows, we restrict to an important special case that covers a broad class of applied models which we will describe subsequently. Specifically, we assume that the functions θ ν , g ν , and h ν are given as follows:
for some matrices M ν ∈ ℜ nν ×nν , which are symmetric positive semidefinite, A I,ν ∈ ℜ mν ×n I , A II,ν ∈ ℜ mν ×n II , B ν,ν ′ ∈ ℜ mν ×n ν ′ , C I,ν ∈ ℜ ℓν ×n I , C II,ν ∈ ℜ ℓν ×n II , D ν ∈ ℜ ℓν ×nν , affine functions c ν : ℜ n I +n II +n −ν → ℜ nν , and arbitrary real-valued functions ψ ν : ℜ n I +n II +n −ν → ℜ. With these specifications, leader I's optimization problem can be written as follows: With x II as an exogenous variable, find (x I , y I , λ I,ν , µ I,ν ) ∈ ℜ n I +n+mν +ℓν to minimize ϕ I (x I , x II , y I ) subject to x I ∈ X I and c ν (
Except for the set X I , which may contain nonlinear (but convex) constraints, and the orthogonality conditions
the remaining constraints in leader I's problem are linear. Informally, our proposal to deal with these nonconvex constraints could be interpreted in the following abstract manner. Each leader has access to only partial information of the followers' responses, which are described by the "favorable" sets Z I (x I , x II ) and Z II (x I , x II ), respectively, and subject to which the leaders optimize their objective functions. In turn, these incomplete response sets could be due to imperfect market conditions, or to a certain market mechanism that "regulates" the followers' reactions, or to the withholding of complete information by the followers. In general, such partial information could be of one of two kinds, restricted or relaxed; restricted information for leader I means
and relaxed information for player I means
Notice that a restricted response must necessarily be an equilibrium response, whereas a relaxed response is not necessarily an equilibrium response. Similar classification applies to the partial responses available to leader II. By separating the responses available to the two leaders, we allow the possibility that one leader has only restricted followers' responses, whereas the other leader has relaxed followers' responses.
In mathematical terms, our proposal is to replace the two nonconvex orthogonality conditions (17) and (18) in leader I's constraints by the following (possibly disequilibrium) conditions:
where W I,ν (x II ) ⊆ ℜ n I +n+mν and V I,ν (x II ) ⊆ ℜ n I +nν +ℓν are appropriate polyhedral sets such that together they represent either a restriction or a relaxation of the complementarity constraints in Y (x I , x II ). Let Z I (x I , x II ) be the set of all tuples y I = y
for which there exists (λ I , µ I ) satisfying, for all ν = 1, . . . , N ,
and (21).
We call the elements of Z I (x I , x II ) the followers' partial responses anticipated by (or available to) leader I and classify such responses as restricted or relaxed according to the satisfaction of (19) or (20), respectively. In terms of the partial responses, leader I's optimization problem is then written as follows: With x II as an exogenous variable, find (x I , y I ) ∈ ℜ n I +n to minimize ϕ I (x I , x II , y I ) subject to x I ∈ X I and (
Similarly, associated with the surrogate complementarity conditions
for leader II, we may define the set Z II (x I , x II ) of partial responses y II anticipated by leader II and further classify such responses as restricted or relaxed according to whether Z II (x I , x II ) is contained in, or contains the true response set Y (x I , x II ). In terms of the partial responses, leader II's optimization problem is then written as follows: With x I as an exogenous variable, find (x II , y II ) ∈ ℜ n I +n to
We say that a pair (x * ,I , x * ,II ) is a remedial L/F Nash equilibrium if there exists (y * ,I , y * ,II ) such that (x * ,I , y * ,I ) and (x * ,II , y * ,II ) constitute a GNE of the two leaders' surrogate optimization problems (22) and (24), respectively.
The following result establishes the existence of remedial L/F Nash equilibria. For simplicity, we assume that various sets involved are bounded. Such boundedness condition can be somewhat relaxed; the details are omitted.
Theorem 5 Let X I and X II be nonempty, bounded polyhedra. Assume (a) for each (x I , x II ) ∈ X I ×X II , the functions ϕ I (·, x II , ·) and ϕ II (x I , ·, ·) are convex and continuously differentiable;
(b) for all ν = 1, . . . , N , the graphs of the four set-valued maps W I,ν , V I,ν , W II,ν , and V II,ν are polyhedra;
(c) for each (x I , x II ) ∈ X I × X II , Z I (x I , x II ) and Z II (x I , x II ) are nonempty;
(d) Z I (X I , X II ) and Z II (X I , X II ) are bounded.
Then there exists a remedial L/F Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Under the given assumptions, the remedial L/F Nash equilibrium problem is a linearly constrained generalized Nash game that satisfies the compactness and feasibility assumption in Subsection 2.2. Consequently, the existence of a remedial L/F Nash equilibrium follows from Theorem 2.
There are many remedial L/F models corresponding to different ways to relax or restrict the complementarity conditions (17) and (18) and their counterparts for leader II. Below we mention several of these choices and illustrate them with the game in Example 4. We consider only the set W I,ν (x II ) because the others are similar. Corresponding to any pair of partitioning index subsets α andᾱ of {1, . . . , m ν }, we can let W I,ν (x II ) be the set of tuples (x I , y I , λ I,ν ) satisfying
This choice yields a set of restricted responses. For a set of relaxed responses, we can let W I,ν (x II ) be a box defined by simple bounds on the tuples (x I , y I , λ I,ν ) that are implied by the followers' equilibrium conditions. Example 4 continued. The full version of the L/F Nash game is stated as follows: Leader I's problem is to minimize Since the follower's equilibrium strategy y is naturally bounded by 0 and 1 because of the same restriction on x I and x II , we may consider the following relaxed L/F Nash game. Leader I's problem is to minimize We leave it to the reader to verify that (x I , y I ) = (0, 0) and (x II , y II ) = (1, 1) constitute the unique GNE to the above relaxed L/F Nash game.
One could argue that the above GNE is not a desirable equilibrium solution to the 2-leader noncooperative game. The reason is that the two leaders are perceiving drastically different follower responses. As an alternative, consider the following restricted L/F Nash game where leader I's problem is minimize Again, the reader can verify that (x I , y I ) = (1, 0) and (x II , y II ) = (0, 0) constitute the unique GNE to the above restricted L/F Nash game. In this equilibrium solution, both leaders arrive at the same follower response.
In summary, we conclude that for this simple 2-leader noncooperative game, if both leaders include the follower's exact response function in their optimization problems, there exists no equilibrium solution. The remedial models are not all desirable; while they always have equilibria, a careful choice of a remedial model leads to a sensible equilibrium solution, whereas a not-so-careful choice could lead to an equilibrium solution where the leaders have entirely different expectations on the follower's behavior.
Multi-L/F Games in Electricity Markets
The subject of noncooperative competition in electricity power markets is of immense contemporary interest due to the privatization and restructuring of this industry that are presently taking place all over the world. In this section, we discuss two approaches in the analysis of electricity power market competition naturally leading to mathematical models that are special cases of the multileader-follower game-theorectic framework presented in the last section. The approaches outlined below represent different market designs that describe the electricity firms' strategic behavior under the forces of competition from rival firms.
Instance I: A competitive bidding problem
While there are many variations of this approach (see e.g. [7, 25, 20] ), in what follows, we present a simple model that contains the main idea of this class of spatial market models. There is a finite set of firms, indexed by the elements in the finite set F, which are competing for market power in an electricity network with node set N . Each firm f submits a bid function b f (q f , ρ f ) to a market maker who is an independent system operator (ISO); this function depends on the (vector) quantity q f ≡ (q f i ) i∈N of supplies by the firm and a parameter ρ f . The ISO employs a market clearing mechanism to determine the price p i at each region and sets the firms' supplies accordingly. One such mechanism is via the solution of an optimization problem as follows. Assume an affine demand curve that yields the price p i as a function of the total regional demand quantity D:
where α i and β i are given positive constants. The market clearing process is then determined by the solution of the following optimization problem whose objective function is the ISO's revenue less the bid costs:
where Q is the set of feasible supplies of the firms. (In many cases, Q is the Cartesian product of |F| sets of lower dimensions, each being the supply set of an individual firm.) The firms' bid parameters ρ f are exogenous to the optimization problem (25) , whose optimal solution set we denoteQ(ρ) ⊆ Q. The latter set represents the market maker's determination of the firms' supplies as per their bids. Assuming that b f (·, ρ f ) is a continuously differentiable, convex function in its first argument for all f ∈ F, an optimal solution (q f ) f ∈F of (25) is characterized by the variational inequality: For all (
is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are the β i for i ∈ N , and
All the firms are aware of the market clearing process; hence they will take problem (25) as part of the constraints in their own profit maximization problems. Assume for simplicity that each firm's profit is its bid function. Taking the rivals' bid parameters ρ −f as exogenous, each firm f 's problem is to determine its bid parameter ρ f in its admissible set Ω f along with all the supply quantities q f,t for t ∈ F by solving
The overall competition problem among all firms can be seen to be a multi-leader single-follower game in which the firms are the leaders and the ISO is the follower. The identification of the variables with those in Section 4 is as follows. For the case of two firms F = {I, II}, the bids ρ I and ρ II are x I and x II , respectively; the firms' supplies q I and q II are the follower's responses y I and y II , respectively; the supply setQ(ρ I , ρ II ) is the follower's response multifunction Y (x I , x II ). The following simple example illustrates this game.
Example 6 (Hobbs) Consider the case of two firms, which we label as I and II, competing in a single region; thus N = {1}. Each firm has a feasible supply set and an admissible bid set that are, respectively, the one-dimensional interval [0, 1/2] and [0, 1]. Let α 1 = β 1 = 1. For f = I and II, let
In this case, problem (25) takes the explicit form:
The KKT system of this optimization problem can be written in the following complementarity form: For f = I, II,
Notice that with ρ f ≥ 0, the multiplier γ f is bounded above by 0. Similarly, firm II's problem is equivalent to the following MPEC: With ρ I as an exogenous variable,
The reader can verify that (ρ * I , ρ * II ) = (0.5, 0.5) is a L/F Nash equilibrium with the firms's unique supplies as follows: (q * I,I , q * I,II ) = (0.5, 0) and (q * II,I , q * II,II ) = (0, 0.5). Again, this is not a desirable equilibrium because there is no common pair of supplies for both firms.
As an alternative to the above model, we could consider a different pair of optimization problems for the firms. The rationale is as follows. Since each firm realizes that it cannot control (as opposed to "anticipate") the rival firm's supply, each firm would take its rival's variables as exogenous to its own optimization problem, while still adhering to the part of the market clearing process that pertains to its supplies. Specifically, firm I's alternative problem is the following MPEC: With q II , ρ II , and γ II as exogenous variables, find q I , ρ I , and γ I to minimize (q I + q II ) 2 − q I − q II + 0. Notice that except for the term −q II , the two exogenous terms ρ II q II and 0.5γ II are excluded from the objective function; the kept term is useful to balance the squared term in the objective. Similarly, firm II's alternative problem is the following MPEC: With q I , ρ I , and γ I as exogenous variables, find q II , ρ II , and γ II to minimize (q I + q II ) 2 − q I − q II + 0. In terms of the latter two optimization problems (which define a generalized Nash model), a L/F Nash equilibrium is given by (ρ * I , ρ * II ) = (0.5, 0.5), (γ * I , γ * II ) = (0, 0), and any (q * I , q * II ) that satisfies q I + q II = 0.5 ( 0, 0 ) ≤ ( q I , q II ) ≤ ( 0.5, 0.5 ).
In summary, this example illustrates that while one version of the 2-firm bidding game has a L/F equilibrium that does not yield a desirable resolution to the game, a modified version of the rules of the game leads to a plausible equilibrium.
Instance II: A model with endogenous arbitrage
An alternative model in electric power markets also leads to a multi-leader-follower game. Originated from [18] and extended in several subsequent papers [9, 21, 28, 33] , the model considers several electricity firms competing in spatially separated markets along with an arbitrager, whose goal is to exploit price differentials between regions to maximize profit. Included in the firms' profit maximization problems is the arbitrager's full maximization problem; this leads to a multileader-follower game, where each leader (firm) solves an MPEC whose equilibrium constraint is the optimality condition of the arbitrager's optimization problem expressed as a linear complementarity system.
There are four main components in the model; the ISO, the arbitrager, the firms, and a market clearing mechanism. The regions are represented by the nodes in a network. We first introduce the basic notation of the model, and then describe each component. cost per unit generation at node i by firm f P 0 i : price intercept of sales function at node i Q 0 i : quantity intercept of sales function at node i e ij :
ISO's unit cost of shipping from node i to j CAP f i : production capacity at node i for firm f Variables s f ij : amount produced at node i and sold at node j by firm f y ij : amount of shipment from node i to j w ij : unit charge of shipping from node i to j, paid by the firms and the arbitrager and received by the ISO a ij : amount bought by arbitrager at node i and sold at j γ f ij : dual variable of production capacity constraint in firm f 's problem p i : market price at node i, a linear function of total sales
The ISO's problem is as follows: Given w ij , (i, j) ∈ N × N , compute y ij , (i, j) ∈ N × N , in order to maximize (i,j)∈N ×N ( w ij − e ij ) y ij subject to y ij ≥ 0, ∀ ( i, j ) ∈ N × N .
The optimality conditions of this problem are 0 ≤ y ij ⊥ w ij − e ij ≤ 0, ∀ ( i, j ) ∈ N × N .
Note that the arbitrager's optimality conditions (28) are included as constraints in each firm's optimization problem. Thus, each firm anticipates that the arbitrager will react optimally to the market prices p i and the transmission charges w ij . The model is completed with the last condition below, which, mathematically, can be thought of as the "dual" condition that is associated with the variable w ij .
The market clearing condition is
